PIKETON, Ohio — American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO), a Centrus Energy subsidiary, has filed a request with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to allow uranium feedstock sourced from foreign suppliers at its Piketon enrichment facility. The move comes after the Department of Energy granted Centrus a waiver in July 2024 that permits imports of low-enriched uranium (LEU) from Russia for deliveries through 2025.
Environmental watchdogs and industry observers say this change could reintroduce contaminated material containing plutonium and other transuranic elements into the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle. During the former U.S.–Russia Megatons to Megawatts program (1993–2013), downblended Russian weapons-grade uranium was processed at Piketon’s Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, where internal DOE reports found trace amounts of plutonium‑238, plutonium‑239 and technetium‑99 embedded in equipment.
Despite ACO’s assurance that its updated control protocols would not reduce safety or effectiveness, the company’s filing does not specify any new testing procedures or isotopic purity standards for foreign-origin uranium.
Watchdog groups are urging regulators to require ACO to implement rigorous isotopic screening, independent third-party verification of uranium purity, and public disclosure of supplier sources and test results before any approval is granted.
The request follows a DOE waiver issued July 18, 2024, under the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, temporarily allowing Centrus to import Russian LEU through 2025, with decisions for 2026 and 2027 deferred. The law permits such waivers through Jan. 1, 2028, if deemed in the national interest or if no viable alternative supply exists.
Critics say the waiver undermines efforts to wean the U.S. off Russian nuclear fuel dominance, while failing to address contamination risks tied to legacy uranium enrichment practices at Piketon.
The outcome of ACO’s NRC review process under 10 CFR Part 70 will determine whether the plant can legally proceed with foreign uranium feedstock, potentially accelerating its High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) demonstration project.
The NRC has not yet announced a decision.
Piketon's Uranium Crossroads
Unpacking the Environmental & Strategic Risks of New Imports at the American Centrifuge Plant
Navigating the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO) has put forward a significant proposal to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC): to permit the use of foreign-sourced uranium feedstock, including material from Russia, at its Piketon enrichment facility. This move, stemming from a temporary DOE waiver, introduces a complex web of environmental, safety, and strategic considerations that demand close scrutiny. This report sheds light on the potential dangers and the critical need for heightened oversight.
ACO's formal submission to the NRC to diversify uranium sources.
Issued July 2024, temporarily permits imports of Russian Low-Enriched Uranium.
The NRC's decision under 10 CFR Part 70 is critical for the facility's future operations.
Past Echoes: The Threat of Legacy Contamination
A primary concern arises from the historical operations at Piketon, specifically the processing of downblended Russian weapons-grade uranium under the "Megatons to Megawatts" program (1993–2013). Internal Department of Energy reports explicitly identified trace amounts of highly hazardous transuranic elements embedded within the plant's equipment. The reintroduction of foreign feedstock risks reactivating or compounding these persistent contaminants, posing a significant environmental hazard.
This radar chart illustrates the relative concern levels for key radionuclides previously detected at the Piketon facility. Plutonium isotopes and Technetium-99, known for their environmental persistence and health risks, are highlighted as areas of elevated concern that require meticulous oversight with any new foreign material.
Critical Oversight Gaps: Unaddressed Protocols
Despite ACO's assertions that updated control protocols would not diminish safety, their current NRC filing notably omits specific new testing procedures or detailed isotopic purity standards for foreign-origin uranium. This lack of explicit measures raises red flags for environmental watchdogs and local communities, especially given the site's history.
No New Testing Procedures Specified
The filing lacks details on updated methods to detect trace contaminants in imported uranium.
Undefined Purity Standards
There are no explicit isotopic purity standards for foreign-sourced uranium mentioned in the request.
Documented Local Contamination
Investigative reports have confirmed radioactive contamination, including plutonium, in Pike County soil and water, emphasizing existing vulnerabilities.
Watchdog Demands: Safeguarding Community & Environment
Environmental and industry oversight groups are actively urging regulators to mandate stringent safeguards. Their calls are clear: rigorous, independent verification and complete transparency are non-negotiable for public safety and trust.
Rigorous Isotopic Screening
Mandatory, comprehensive testing of all incoming foreign uranium for trace contaminants.
Independent Third-Party Verification
External and impartial verification of uranium purity to ensure objectivity and accountability.
Full Public Disclosure
Complete transparency regarding supplier sources and all test results, accessible to the public.
Strategic Ripples: Beyond Environmental Safety
The NRC's decision on foreign uranium imports at Piketon extends beyond immediate environmental concerns, touching upon vital aspects of national energy security and the acceleration of key domestic nuclear initiatives.
Undermines Energy Independence
Critics argue the waiver contradicts efforts to reduce reliance on foreign, particularly Russian, nuclear fuel.
HALEU Project Acceleration
Approval could expedite ACO's High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) demonstration project.
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