A class-action lawsuit, Walburn et al. v. Centrus Energy Corp. et al., filed in September 2020, brought to light extensive allegations of a decades-long pattern of corruption, dosimetry manipulation, and environmental contamination at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) in Piketon, Ohio. While this specific lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs on November 11, 2021, and officially terminated on November 17, 2021, its allegations remain a critical part of the historical record regarding PORTS and the broader challenges of accountability in the nuclear industry. The lawsuit claimed that plant operators, including the United States Department of Energy (USDOE) and various contractors, engaged in a "Nuclear Fraud Enterprise" to conceal the true extent of radiation exposure to workers and the surrounding communities, prioritizing profit and operational goals over public safety.

Compounding these concerns, a newly declassified 2013 dosimetry file reveals a concerning pattern of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) personnel not consistently wearing their personal dosimetry badges. This internal communication raises significant questions about the rigor and effectiveness of regulatory oversight at a site with such severe alleged contamination issues. The allegations from the Walburn lawsuit included the fraudulent manipulation and destruction of dosimetry badges and medical records, secret introduction of "out of specification" uranium and plutonium from Russia, and intentional atmospheric releases of toxic, radioactive gases. These alleged actions led to widespread illness, genetic damage, and property contamination across Ohio and Kentucky.

This report primarily focuses on the implications of the internal Ohio EPA communications regarding dosimetry, highlighting potential regulatory blind spots and a perceived lack of robust external oversight. The allegations from the Walburn lawsuit serve as crucial background, detailing the alleged history of negligence and secrecy at PORTS. The analysis underscores the profound challenges in ensuring accountability and transparency within the nuclear industry, particularly when faced with alleged systemic misconduct and a perceived lack of robust external oversight. The enduring nature of radioactive contamination ensures that the consequences of these alleged actions will persist for generations, demanding urgent attention to protect public health and the environment.

The Shadow of Allegations at Portsmouth

The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS), a vast 3,777-acre nuclear industrial site in Piketon, Ohio, has long been a focal point of controversy regarding its environmental and health impacts. Originally established in 1954 for highly enriched uranium production for weapons manufacturing, power plants, and the nuclear Navy, PORTS has been the subject of a significant class-action lawsuit, Walburn et al. v. Centrus Energy Corp. et al.. Filed on September 3, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the complaint asserted claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Price-Anderson Act, among other state laws. While this specific lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs on November 11, 2021, and officially terminated on November 17, 2021, its allegations continue to highlight a history of alleged misconduct at PORTS.

The Walburn lawsuit alleged a "pattern of corruption and flagrant disregard for human life" by the defendants, including Centrus Energy Corp. (successor to USEC Incorporated), Lockheed Martin Corp., and various other contractors and individuals involved in the plant's operation and decommissioning. The plaintiffs, comprising current and former nuclear workers, their families, school children, correctional workers, inmates, and community members, sought to halt what they described as the ongoing poisoning of people, land, air, and water in Pike and Scioto Counties, Ohio and surrounding areas.

Central to the Walburn complaint were claims of widespread dosimetry cover-ups, including the fraudulent manipulation of dosimetry badges and the destruction of worker medical records. These alleged acts of concealment were presented as part of a larger "Nuclear Fraud Enterprise" designed to suppress information regarding reckless and criminal operations at PORTS for pecuniary gain. A critical layer to these concerns is a newly declassified 2013 dosimetry file, which provides internal Ohio EPA communications that shed light on the agency's own practices regarding radiation monitoring. The allegations collectively paint a picture of an industry where transparency and safety may have been systematically compromised, raising profound concerns about the long-term consequences for public health and national security.

Dosimetry Cover-ups: Evidence from Internal EPA Communications

The newly declassified 2013 dosimetry file reveals a concerning trend regarding the use of dosimetry badges by Ohio EPA personnel themselves. These internal documents show that multiple Ohio EPA staff members consistently did not wear their personal radiation monitors over several quarters in 2013. Explicit notes in the logs indicate badges were "not used-in package" or "NA/Not worn".

For instance, an email exchange from November 2013 within these dosimetry records highlights this issue directly. A Site Coordinator for the Ohio EPA's Division of Environmental Response and Revitalization, confirmed in a November 14, 2013, email that her team received new Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLDs) for the quarter ending in December. Crucially, she stated, "Since we do not even take them out of the plastic (except for the visitor badges, we use them on occasion), it would be good to get them stopped". A Sr. Health Physicist, subsequently acted upon this request, confirming that the "SED series of badges for sub account 1406072 should now be canceled". This communication explicitly demonstrates a pattern of receiving and not using personal dosimetry badges, leading to efforts to discontinue the service due to non-usage. This consistent non-usage by several individuals, contrasted with the active use of "visitor badges" for specific inspections, points to a potential culture of complacency within certain segments of the regulatory body. When personnel responsible for environmental oversight at a nuclear site do not consistently monitor their own radiation exposure, it suggests a possible disconnect between the alleged severe dangers at PORTS, as detailed in the Walburn lawsuit, and the regulators' internal assessment of their own occupational safety needs. This perceived low personal risk could translate into less rigorous or proactive external oversight of the very facilities they are mandated to regulate.

The contrast between the alleged criminal manipulation and destruction of dosimetry records by PORTS operators, as claimed in the Walburn lawsuit, and the passive failure of Ohio EPA personnel to even wear their own monitoring badges highlights a concerning double standard of accountability. While one entity is accused of actively hiding crucial safety data, the other, tasked with oversight, appears to be failing to collect its own basic safety monitoring data. This disparity raises questions about the credibility and effectiveness of the regulatory system. If the watchdog agency itself exhibits internal inconsistencies in adhering to basic personal radiation monitoring, it suggests that its oversight might be compromised or perceived as less credible. This situation reinforces the argument that the regulatory system for nuclear facilities may be fundamentally flawed, not only due to alleged industry malfeasance but also due to inadequate or complacent oversight by the very agencies tasked with protecting the public.

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant: A History of Negligence and Secrecy

The history of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant is, according to allegations from the Walburn lawsuit, deeply marred by a persistent pattern of negligence, environmental disregard, and deliberate secrecy. This pattern allegedly spans decades, from the Cold War era through subsequent operational shifts and cleanup efforts.

From Cold War to Cleanup: Persistent Safety Failures

PORTS, which began operations around 1954, initially focused on uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons. During this period, the plant allegedly engaged in "reckless and dangerous practices," prioritizing bomb production over worker safety and environmental protection. This foundational disregard for safety appears to have set a precedent for later operations.

Historically, the Department of Energy (DOE) was not subject to environmental regulation until the late 1980s, leaving agencies like the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) with no jurisdiction over PORTS. Even after limited access was granted to OEPA in 1986, alarming discoveries were made, including highly radioactive oils tilled into the soil, radioactive and toxic materials dumped into ditches leading to local creeks, and carcinogenic solvents discarded. The DOE's own 1989 "Tiger Team Assessment" corroborated these findings, documenting "woefully inadequate safety practices, including routine criminal acts such as wiring around alarms, mishandling of radioactive materials, worker exposure to radioactive materials, failure to monitor emissions, [and] poor record keeping". The lawsuit claimed that PORTS experienced "at least 400 accidental releases of uranium gas or toxic fluorine," including a massive release of over 9.5 million grams of uranium in 1978.

A particularly egregious allegation describes "Midnight Rockets," where PORTS management "regularly and purposefully vented raw UF6, transuranics, heavy metals, and other toxic chemicals into the atmosphere from the roof of the process buildings". These releases were reportedly "always done at night," with security personnel allegedly "covered in the escaping materials". The Midnight Rockets was recently confirmed by the Ohio Atomic Press. Furthermore, Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS), designed to warn workers of dangerous radiation levels, were allegedly "often inoperable, obstructed, and improperly calibrated". This systemic failure to maintain critical safety infrastructure dramatically increased the exposure of workers to radioactive and hazardous chemicals. The lawsuit also detailed a pervasive culture of fear and retaliation against individuals who dared to raise safety concerns, with specific instances of violence and threats attributed to a former plant manager.

This consistent, decades-long pattern of prioritizing production and, later, privatization over safety reveals a deeply embedded organizational priority at PORTS. Across different historical periods, management, and operational objectives (from military production to commercial enrichment and ultimately privatization), there appears to have been a systemic cultural issue where achieving business goals consistently took precedence over safety, environmental integrity, and transparency. This historical trend provides a compelling basis for the anti-nuclear narrative, suggesting that the fundamental structure and inherent incentives within the nuclear industry may lead to such compromises, irrespective of specific regulations or changes in management. This undermines public trust in the industry's ability to operate safely.

Illegal Shipments of Special Nuclear Material (SNM)

The Walburn complaint outlined serious allegations of "criminal diversion of HEU from PORTS" and the transportation of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in "uncovered, unprotected trucks" for years, including within the six-year statute of limitations period. Materials deceptively identified as "spare parts," such as compressors allegedly filled with high assay SNM, were purportedly shipped out with improper Department of Transportation placards. In one instance, a truck with a "White 1" label (indicating non-hazardous) was allegedly rejected at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant for being "too radiologically hot". It was also alleged that highly contaminated motors were sent to local dumps and treated as ordinary refuse. According to the lawsuit, these actions represent a "complete loss of control of highly valuable and highly dangerous materials," posing an "immense national security risk".

The "Midnight Rockets," widespread destruction of medical and dosimetry records, and the alleged deliberate withholding of critical information regarding the 1998 fire, collectively form a self-perpetuating cycle of concealment. Each of these distinct actions serves a common purpose: to hide or erase evidence of harmful, often illegal, activities. If these acts of concealment are successful in avoiding significant legal or public repercussions, they reinforce the behavior. This creates a cycle where initial misconduct, such as unauthorized releases or mishandling of dangerous materials, is followed by active efforts to hide it. If these cover-ups are effective in preventing accountability, the alleged perpetrators may be emboldened to continue or even escalate the misconduct, operating under the assumption that their actions can remain hidden. This cycle is particularly dangerous in the nuclear context, where the long-term consequences of hidden contamination are severe, irreversible, and can span generations. It underscores the profound difficulty of achieving true accountability and transparency in an industry with such a history of alleged secrecy and evasion.

Challenges in Accountability: Legal Frameworks and Public Health

The Walburn class-action lawsuit, though voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs on November 11, 2021, and officially terminated on November 17, 2021, represents a significant attempt to seek accountability for alleged misconduct at PORTS. Its allegations highlight several critical challenges in the pursuit of justice for those potentially impacted by nuclear operations.

The Price-Anderson Act's Complex Role

The Price-Anderson Act (PAA) is a federal law designed to provide a framework for liability and compensation in the event of a "nuclear incident". It establishes the exclusive federal cause of action for such incidents, aiming to consolidate claims and ensure a compensation mechanism for victims. However, the plaintiffs in the Walburn lawsuit explicitly argued that the "intent of the PAA was 'not' to indemnify criminal activity". This assertion raises fundamental questions about the Act's effectiveness in deterring and fully penalizing severe corporate and individual misconduct, especially when alleged criminal acts, such as the fraudulent manipulation of dosimetry records, are involved. The PAA's broad preemption of state law tort claims, as affirmed in cases like Matthews v. Centrus Energy Corporation, further complicates victims' ability to pursue redress through traditional legal avenues.

Impediments to Worker Compensation

A direct consequence of the alleged systematic destruction and alteration of dosimetry records, as claimed in the Walburn lawsuit, is the severe impediment it poses to PORTS workers seeking compensation. Accurate dosimetry records are crucial for proving radiation exposure, which is often a prerequisite for successful claims under programs like the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA). The lawsuit alleged that the "inability to recreate doses for workers" has resulted in denied EEOICPA claims, forcing victims to bear "immense expenditures from private insurance companies and individual workers" for medical costs that should have been covered.

This situation illustrates a significant shift in the burden of proof onto the victims. In legal and compensation contexts, the party claiming harm typically bears the responsibility of proving that harm. By allegedly destroying the primary evidence—accurate dosimetry records—the defendants make it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to meet this burden. This effectively shifts the investigative, evidentiary, and financial burden onto the injured parties. This tactic is a common feature in cases of corporate malfeasance where evidence suppression frustrates justice. In the nuclear context, given the long latency periods for radiation-induced diseases, this tactic is particularly devastating, as victims may not even know they are ill until years or decades after the crucial evidence has been destroyed. This fundamentally undermines the purpose of compensation programs designed to assist those harmed by nuclear operations.

The Enduring Shadow of Nuclear Risk

The Walburn et al. v. Centrus Energy Corp. et al. lawsuit, despite its dismissal, illuminates a deeply troubling narrative surrounding the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, characterized by alleged criminal conspiracy, systematic dosimetry cover-ups, and extensive environmental contamination. The complaint detailed accusations of the secret introduction of undeclared nuclear materials from Russia and potentially deliberate acts, such as arson, aimed at concealing evidence of misconduct. These grave allegations, if proven, paint a stark picture of a nuclear operation where profit motives and a culture of secrecy may have systematically overridden fundamental safety protocols and public trust.

The newly declassified 2013 Ohio EPA dosimetry records, revealing a pattern of regulatory personnel not consistently wearing personal radiation monitors, introduce a critical dimension to this discussion. While distinct from the plant's alleged criminal acts, this practice highlights potential blind spots and a concerning lack of consistent self-monitoring within the very agencies tasked with oversight. Such internal inconsistencies raise serious questions about the overall effectiveness and rigor of external oversight mechanisms for nuclear facilities. If those responsible for regulating nuclear safety do not consistently adhere to basic personal protection measures, it suggests a broader systemic issue that could allow alleged industry malfeasance to persist unchecked.

These findings, when considered collectively, powerfully underscore a critical argument from an anti-nuclear perspective: that the pursuit of nuclear operations, even for ostensibly beneficial purposes like energy production or non-proliferation, carries inherent and often unacknowledged risks. These risks, exacerbated by alleged profit motives and a pervasive culture of secrecy, can lead to profound human suffering, irreversible environmental degradation, and a fundamental breakdown of accountability. The extraordinarily long half-lives of radioactive materials ensure that the legacy of any alleged misconduct will persist for generations, casting a perpetual shadow over affected communities and the environment.

The historical allegations and the documented evidence presented demand immediate and profound changes within the nuclear industry and its regulatory framework. This includes a fervent call for greater transparency from nuclear operators, the establishment of robust and truly independent oversight mechanisms, and the urgent refinement of legal frameworks to ensure full and unequivocal accountability for any alleged criminal acts. The ultimate goal must be to protect both current and future generations from the enduring and potentially catastrophic shadow of nuclear contamination and its concealed consequences.